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THE RESIDUAL HEARSAY EXCEPTION RECONSIDERED
JAMES E. BEAVER*
I. INTRODUCTION
W E have an adversary system of justice in the English-speaking
countries.' Thus, the responsibility to put in evidence rests with
the parties, not with the court. While the last actual trial by battle
occurred in 1638,2 we still have a "battle of wits"' in which each party
through counsel puts on the best possible case.
Extracting the truth in the typical trial situation normally involves a
clash between two competing stories. Zealous advocacy is a duty re-
quired of every attorney4 and demands that the attorney present an
account of the case in a light that best serves the client's interests.' In
preparation for trial, an attorney ought to vigorously dig out the hid-
den pieces of pertinent information. During the search for auspicious
evidence, witnesses are deposed, interrogatories are served, documents
are examined, physical and mental examinations are performed, and
experts are asked to give opinions. At the end of the search, each
party formulates a separate narrative from the same body of evidence.
Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law. B.A., 1952, Wesleyan
University; J.D., 1958, University of Chicago. The author gratefully acknowledges the invalua-
ble research assistance of Mr. Bayly Miller, a 1991 graduate of The University of Puget Sound
School of Law, and Mr. David R. Johnson, a 1992 graduate of The University of Puget Sound
School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985); Singer
v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965); GEOFFREY HAZARD, ETtICS IN TIE PRACTICE OF LAW 127
(1978).
2. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1299 (3d ed. 1969). The date, however, is open to some
dispute. Compare J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LEOA HISTORY 413-14 (Butter-
worths 2d ed. 1979) ("The appeal had been defunct since medieval times.") with BoUvmR's LAW
DICTIONARY 3416 (3d rev. 1914) (wager of battle was in the statutes of South Carolina as late as
1857).
3. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring); Hardman
v. Helene Curtis Indus., 198 N.E.2d 681 (I11. App. 1964); David M. Morris, Note, Attorney Fee
Forfeiture, 86 Cotum. L. REv. 1021, 1050 (1986).
4. MODEL RULEts OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1983) ("A lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."); see also Whiteside v. Scurr, 744
F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
5. MODEL RULES OF PRorssIoNA. CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983). Such conduct, however, is
limited. A lawyer may not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribu-
nal. Id.
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Before a jury of one's peers, each narrative will undergo rigorous
cross-examination designed to unearth the truth. Evidence is given un-
der oath in the morally suasive courtroom atmosphere, while the trier
of fact assiduously peruses the countenances of the witnesses. The
trial is controlled by rules of evidence, and it is within the rules of
evidence that we find one of our greatest engines for truth-the rule
against hearsay.'
Next to a trial by jury, there is, perhaps, nothing more esteemed in
our Anglo-American law of evidence than the rule against hearsay. 7
Before there was a rule against hearsay, a person might be tried and
convicted by an out-of-court declaration without being allowed the
opportunity to confront his or her accuser. Such was the case when
Sir Walter Raleigh was found guilty of high treason in 1603.8 Raleigh
was convicted largely on the evidence of a statement from an alleged
fellow conspirator, Lord Cobham, who himself was in prison and was
not produced at the trial. Cobham later retracted his confession,
which retraction (according to advocates of the Crown) was later re-
called. 9
By the 1500s, the testimony of witnesses had become the principal
source of proof. 0 The practice of using a jury (originally a jury of
twenty-four men") started to appear around the year 1122 under the
reign of Henry I of England." Apart from this developing system,
"trial by battle" and "trial by ordeal" were frequently employed.'3
As testimony by witnesses given in court became the predominant
source of proof, it became evident that hearsay was generally unrelia-
6. FED. R. EvTD. 801.
7. JOHN H. WIMoRE, EVIDENCE IN TR ALS AT CoMoNio LAW § 1364(II)(9) (James H.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974). Wigmore called the rule "that most characteristic rule of the Anglo-
American law of evidence-a rule which may be esteemed, next to jury trial, the greatest contri-
bution of that eminently practical legal system to the world's methods of procedure." Id.
8. JOHN G. PHILLIMORE, HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF TIE LAW OF EVIDENCE 157-68 (1850).
See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 177 n.10 (1970); Richard L. Marcus, The Tudor
Treason Trials: Some Observations on the Emergence of Forensic Themes, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV.
675.
9. PHnLLIMOLE, supra note 8, at 163-64. See also Marcus, supra note 8.
10. JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 53-65
(1898).
11. Id. at 53 ("[A]ssemble the County of Berkshire and cause twenty-four of the older men
to be chosen to answer on oath."). Blackstone states the jury starts at twelve (including the
plaintiff), but that the opponent was allowed to match that number with his own "compurga-
tors." 3 WELILAm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *343; see also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972).
12. THAYER, supra note 10, at 53-65.
13. Id. at 34-46. The practice of wager of battle is discussed at 3 WILLAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *337-41; trial by ordeal is discussed at 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*342-45.
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ble. 14 In time, an exclusionary rule was developed to control the cir-
cumstances in which hearsay could be admitted because hearsay came
to be considered inherently unreliable. The rule against hearsay al-
lows the trier of fact to hear the witness subjected to contemporane-
ous cross-examination. Cross-examination allows the trier of fact to
check for signs of nervousness, friendly or hostile attitude, hesita-
tions, and accuracy in perception and memory. Cross-examination
may reveal errors, falsifications, unreliability of a declarant's asser-
tions, or "twistifications."
Exceptions to the rule against hearsay supposedly are grounded in
the premise that use of an extrajudicial statement is necessary and/or
was made under circumstances that guarantee its trustworthiness.' 6
When these requirements are relaxed, the rule against hearsay tends to
disappear. Currently, the federal rules recognize forty (more or less)
exceptions to hearsay.' 7 In addition to the "nonhearsay" exceptions,"5
the exceptions include the residual or "catchall" exceptions 803(24)
and 804(b)(5), which the State of Washington and twenty-three other
states have refused to adopt. 9 Of all the exceptions, the residual ex-
ceptions have probably generated the greatest amount of contro-
versy.20
14. See THAYER, supra note 10, at 518-19; 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 214-19 (3d ed. 1944); see also United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977).
15. WiMORE, supra note 7, § 1364(I)(2).
16. Id. § 1422; see also Scholle v. Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust, 285 F.2d 318, 321
(2d Cir. 1960).
17. DAVID F. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK 86 (2d ed. 1983).
18. FED. R. EvlD. 801(d)(1), (2), etc.
19. BINDER, supra note 17, § 40.03 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1990). The adopting states are
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, Nebraska, New Mexico, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Id.
20. See Feeda F. Bein, Prior Inconsistent Statements: The Hearsay Rule, 801(d)(J)(A) and
803(24), 26 UCLA L. REv. 967 (1979); Paul Bergman, Ambiguity: The Hidden Hearsay Danger
Almost Nobody Talks About, 75 Ky. L.J. 841 (1987); Jonathan E. Grant, The Equivalent Cir-
cumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness Standard for Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24), 90
DICK. L. REv. 75 (1985); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Scope of the Residual Hearsay Excep-
tions in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 SAN DIGO L. REv. 239 (1978); Randolph N. Jonakait,
The Subversion of the Hearsay Rule: The Residual Hearsay Exceptions, Circumstantial Guaran-
tees of Trustworthiness, and Grand Jury Testimony, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 431 (1986); Scott
M. Lewis, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: Shuffling the Wild Cards, 15
RUTGERS L.J. 101 (1983); George R. Nock, Twist and Shout and Truth Will Out: An Argument
for the Adoption of a "Safety-Valve" Exception to the Washington Hearsay Rule, 12 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REv. 1 (1988); John L. Ross, Confrontation and Residual Hearsay: A Critical Exami-
nation and a Proposal for Military Courts, 118 MEL. L. REv. 31 (1987); David A. Sonenshein,
The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57
N.Y.U. L. REv. 867 (1982); Fredrica Hochman, Note, The Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay
19931
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The residual hearsay exceptions threaten to swallow the hearsay
rule. 2' Since 1975, the use of Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), and their
state equivalents, have been reported in more than 140 federal cases
and in more than ninety state cases.22 Contrary to the intent of Con-
Rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Critical Examination, 31 RUTGERS L. Rv. 687 (1978);
Gary W. Majors, Comment, Admitting "Near Misses" Under the Residual Hearsay Exceptions,
66 OR. L. REv. 599 (1988); Michael E. McCue, Note, Nebraska's Residual Hearsay Exceptions:
How Broad a Scope?, 61 NE. L. REV. 187 (1982); Kathryn J. Stumpf, Comment, The Catchall
Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule: Merging Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 37 FED'N INS. & CORP. CouNs. Q. 73 (1986); Lizbeth A. Turner, Comment, Admis-
sion of Grand Jury Testimony Under the Residual Hearsay Exception, 59 TuL. L. REv. 1033
(1985).
21. See sources cited supra note 20. The cited articles note how residual exceptions 803(24)
and 804(b) (5) have caused substantial erosion to the rule against hearsay. For a strong example
of the dangers of hearsay testimony and an eroding hearsay rule, see United States v. Gonzalez,
559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cit. 1977).
22. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTrIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL,
360-74, 436-38 (5th ed. 1990) & 78-81, 90-93 (Supp. 1992). See also State v. Bravo, 762 P.2d
1318 (Ariz. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1039 (1989); State v. Smith, 673 P.2d 17 (Ariz. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1074 (1984); State v. Barger, 810 P.2d 191 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990), rev.
denied, 812 P.2d 628 (Ariz. 1991); State v. Ruelas, 798 P.2d 1335 (Ariz. Ct. App.), rev. granted
in part and denied in part, 798 P.2d 1307 (Ariz. 1990); State v. Ramirez, 688 P.2d 1063 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1984); State v. Hughes, 584 P.2d 584 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Smith v. State, 798
S.W.2d 94 (Ark. 1990); Ward v. State, 770 S.W.2d 109 (Ark. 1989); Blaylock v. Strecker, 724
S.W.2d 470 (Ark. 1987); Hill v. Brown, 672 S.W.2d 330 (Ark. 1984); In re Cheryl H., 200 Cal.
Rptr. 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Bowers, 801 P.2d 511 (Colo. 1990); People v. New-
brough, 803 P.2d 155 (Colo. 1990); Stevens v. People, 796 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1990); Oldsen v.
People, 732 P.2d 1132 (Colo. 1986); People v. Mathes, 703 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1985); W.C.L. v.
People, 685 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1984); State v. Torres, 556 A.2d 1013 (Conn. 1989); In re Sean H.,
586 A.2d 1171 (Conn. App. Ct.), certif. denied, 588 A.2d 1078 (Conn. 1991); State v. Tyson,
579 A.2d 1083 (Conn. App. Ct.), certif. denied, 582 A.2d 207 (Conn. 1990); State v. Maldon-
ado, 536 A.2d 600 (Conn. App. Ct.), certif. denied, 541 A.2d 1239 (Conn. 1988); Distefano v.
State, 526 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); People v. Coleman, 563 N.E.2d 1010 (Il. App. Ct.
1990), appeal denied, 567 N.E.2d 335 (Ill. 1991); State v. Burrell, 412 N.W.2d 556 (Iowa 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 937 (1988); State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10 (Iowa 1983); Fitch v. Burns,
782 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. 1989); Wager v. Commonwealth, 751 S.W.2d 28 (Ky. 1988); Estes v. Com-
monwealth, 744 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1987); Maynard v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 628 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1977); Buckbee v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 561 So. 2d 76 (La. 1990); Commonwealth v.
Pope, 491 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. 1986); People v. Straight, 424 N.W.2d 257 (Mich. 1988); State v.
Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 693 (1991); State v. Renier, 373
N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1985); State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1981); Ecklin v. Planet Ins.
Co., No. C7-90-1521, 1991 WL 1956 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 1991); State v. Lundquist, No.
CO-90-419, 1990 WL 188729 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1990); In re K.R.C. No. C6-90-604, 1990
WL 140798 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 2. 1990): State v. Willette. 421 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988); State v. Smith, 384 N.W.2d 546 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986); M.N.D. v. B.M.D., 356 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Cummins
v. State, 515 So. 2d 869 (Miss. 1987); State v. J.C.E., 767 P.2d 309 (Mont. 1988); State v. Plant,
461 N.W.2d 253 (Neb. 1990); Petersen v. Petersen, 451 N.W.2d 390 (Neb. 1990); Schoch's Es-
tate v. Kail, 311 N.W.2d 903 (Neb. 1981); State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667 (N.J. 1988); State v.
Engel, 493 A.2d 1217 (N.J. 1985); Whalen v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 529 N.Y.S.2d 52 (N.Y.
App. Term 1988); State v. Lynch, 393 S.E.2d 811 (N.C. 1990); State v. Cummings, 389 S.E.2d
66 (N.C. 1990); State v. Fletcher, 368 S.E.2d 633 (N.C. 1988); State v. McElrath, 366 S.E.2d 442
(N.C. 1988); State v. Triplett, 340 S.E.2d 736 (N.C. 1986); State v. Fearing, 337 S.E.2d 551
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gress, these figures suggest that the catchall exceptions are being used
more generally than in rare and exceptional circumstances.23
Acknowledging that the residual exceptions have potential to oblit-
erate the rule against hearsay, this widespread use compels us to ask
whether the rule against hearsay will be viable. This Article argues
that the catchall exceptions weaken the rule against hearsay, and that
the policy of fostering fair trials is best advanced by excluding the
catchall exceptions from the Rules of Evidence. In support of this ar-
gument, the Article explores the creation of the residual exceptions,
explains why at least one state-Washington-has refused to adopt
the residuals, and maintains that adoption is both undesirable and un-
necessary.
II. CREATION OF THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTION
The case most frequently cited in support of a residual exception
managed to reach a correct result without any residual exception at
all. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Dallas County v.
Commercial Union Association Co.24 addressed the issue of whether
the tower of the county courthouse in Selma, Alabama, collapsed be-
cause it was struck by lightning (covered by insurance) or because of
structural weakness and deterioration of the structure (not covered).
When the structure was investigated, charcoal and charred timbers
(N.C. 1985); State v. Smith, 337 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. 1985); In re Hayden, 384 S.E.2d 558 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1989); State v. Moore, 360 S.E.2d 293 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), rev. denied, 364 S.E.2d
664 (N.C. 1988); Phillips & Jordan Inv. Corp. v. Ashblue Co., 357 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App.),
rev. denied, 360 S.E.2d 92 (N.C. 1987); State v. Platt, 354 S.E.2d 332 (N.C. Ct. App.), rev.
denied, 358 S.E.2d 529 (N.C. 1987); State v. Hollingsworth, 337 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985); Torgerson v. Rose, 339 N.W.2d 79 (N.D. 1983); State v. Boston, 545 N.E.2d 1220 (Ohio
1989); State v. Woodring, 577 N.E.2d 1157 (Ohio Ct, App. 1989); Barr v. State, 761 P.2d 897
(Okla. Crim. App. 1988); Newbury v. State, 695 P.2d 531 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); In re
A.D.B., 778 P.2d 945 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Campbell, 705 P.2d 694 (Or. 1985); State
v. Apperson, 736 P.2d 1026 (Or. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Vosika, 731 P.2d 449 (Or. App. 1987);
State v. Harris, 717 P.2d 242 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); Commonwealth v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631 (Pa.
1981); Commonwealth v. Haber, 505 A.2d 273 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); L.W.B. v. Sosnowski, 543
A.2d 1241 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988); State v. Davis, 401 N.W.2d 721 (S.D. 1987); In re C.L., 397
N.W.2d 81 (S.D. 1986); State v. Traversie, 387 N.W.2d 2 (S.D. 1986); State v. McCafferty, 356
N.W.2d 159 (S.D. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1172 (1986); State v. Edward, 400 S.E.2d 843
(W. Va. 1990); State v. Sorenson, 421 N.W.2d 77 (Wis. 1988); Mitchell v. State, 267 N.W.2d
349 (Wis. 1978); State v. Washington, 461 N.W.2d 448 (Wis. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 465
N.W.2d 655 (Wis. 1990); State v. Sorenson, 449 N.W.2d 280 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989); Kurtz v.
Burlington No. R.R. Co., 447 N.W.2d 394 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Brunner, 433 N.W. 2d
334 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Borchert, 284 N.W.2d 120 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
23. S. REp. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051,
7066. The residual exceptions were intended to be used in only exceptional and unanticipated
situations which are not specifically covered by the specific exceptions. Id.
24. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961) (hearsay, if reliable, can be admitted where declarant is
available for cross-examination, but does not testify), overruled in part, Fidelity & Casualty Co.
v. Funell, 383 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1967).
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were found. To show that lightning may not have been the cause of
the charring, the insurer offered in evidence a copy of a newspaper
article published in Selma fifty years earlier, which described a fire in
the courthouse while it was under construction. 2 The article did not
fit within any recognized hearsay exception; nevertheless, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that if hearsay evidence is especially necessary and
contains sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, the
evidence can be admitted even though it does not fit within one of the
recognized exceptions.26 In this instance the necessity was the fact that
knowledgeable witnesses had either died or their memories had
faded." The special mark of trustworthiness was the knowledge that a
local newspaper would be highly unlikely to falsify a story widely
known and discussed in the community.28 In the years that followed
Dallas County, efforts were undertaken-mainly by law professors-
to codify a uniform set of hearsay exceptions, and they often advo-
cated the residual exception. 29
Congress considered the hearsay exceptions in the period following
1972.30 In the original draft of 803(24) as propounded by the Advisory
Committee and adopted by the United States Supreme Court,3 a hear-
say statement could be admitted if it was found to have "comparable
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. '3 2 The House Judiciary
Committee originally deleted the residual exceptions out of concern
that they would inject "too much uncertainty" into the law of evi-
dence and "hinder the ability of practitioners to prepare for trial."
3
Rather than approve such a vague rule, the House Committee pro-
25. Id. at 390-91.
26. Id. at 396-98.
27. Id. at 396.
28. Id. at 397.
29. Rupert Cross, What Should Be Done About the Rule Against Hearsay, 1965 CFIM. L.
REV. 68; Mason Ladd, Uniform Evidence Rules in the Federal Courts, 49 VA. L. REV. 692
(1963); B.H. McPherson, A Statutory Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 5 U. QuEENSL. L.J. 30
(1965); G.D. Nokes, Some Suggestions on Hearsay, 1965 CRnd. L. REV. 81; Lester B. Orfield,
Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence, 67 DICK. L. REv. 381 (1963); Jack B. Weinstein, The Uni-
formily-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Federal Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L.
REV. 353 (1969); James R. Clark, Comment, Evidence Law in Wisconsin: Towards a More Prac-
tical, Rational and Codified Approach, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 1178.
30. See Federal Rules of Evidence Act, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975); Rules of
Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Rules of Evidence (Supplement):
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. REP. No. 1597,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. REP. No. 1277, supra note 23.
31. H.R. REP. No. 650, supra note 30, at 5.
32. Id.; S. REP. No. 1277, supra note 23, at 7065.
33. H.R. REP. No. 650, supra note 30, at 6.
RESIDUAL HEARSAY EXCEPTION
posed that it be excised because Rule 102 would "permit sufficient
flexibility to admit hearsay evidence in appropriate cases under vari-
ous factual situations that might arise."' 34 Adoption of the residual
exceptions did not occur until the Senate added amendments to pro-
vide greater liberality. 3 The Senate considered-this author thinks er-
roneously-that any unfettered exercise of judicial discretion could be
eliminated.3 6 Under the amended exception, a statement could be ad-
mitted if it had:
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines
that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)
the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and
the interests of justice will be served by admission of the statement
into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse
party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including
the name and address of the declarant a7
Of particular importance are the provisions that the evidence be more
probative on the point than other evidence and that notice be given.
Though their application has perhaps demonstrated otherwise, the
drafters thought that these two requirements would provide adequate
safeguards against abuse.38 Since their inception, the residual excep-
tions have created a kind of revolution in many jurisdictions, a revo-
lution which could escalate. The sort of unfair trial Sir Walter Raleigh
had to face so long ago has once again become a very plausible occur-
rence.
Though hearsay exceptions 803(24) and 804(b)(5) have had substan-
tial acceptance within the legal community, there has been some quite
harsh criticism. Many who favor the residual exceptions do so with
the caveat that requirements for admissibility should be altered or that
34. S. REP. No. 1277, supra note 23, at 7065. Rule 102 states that the rules should be
"construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay,
and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." FED. R. EviD. 102.
35. S. RaP. No. 1277, supra note 23, at 7065-66.
36. Id.
37. FED. R. Evsn. 803(24).
38. S. Rip. No. 1277, supra note 23, at 7066.
1993]
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the entire rule should be modified.3 9 Others who accept the residuals
urge stricter adherence to the requirements.4 From all the writing on
residual hearsay, one message is very clear: few are satisfied with how
it operates and with how it has been applied.4 ' For the states that have
adopted the residual exceptions, the concerns originally expressed by
the House Judiciary Committee have become prophetic. 42
III. WASHINGTON'S REFUSAL To ADOPT THE CATCHALL EXCEPTIONS:
ONE STATE'S EXPERIENCE
Between 1976 and 1978, the Washington Judicial Council ("WJC")
met on numerous occasions to discuss adopting the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 43 Rather than adopt the residual exceptions, the Judicial
Council decided that Rule 102 would give sufficient room for "growth
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may
be ascertained."4 The WJC found that the residual exceptions poten-
tially nullify the rule against hearsay because they allow the trial judge
too much discretion. 45 Though the exceptions contain safeguards, the
WJC noted that the trial judge may use the elastic standards to create
new exceptions. Thus, the WJC thought the rule against hearsay, our
most esteemed rule for promoting a fair trial, would be too easily sub-
verted.46
By refusing to adopt the residual exceptions, Washington State has
avoided the dangers that come with the use of such an amorphous
exception. The residuals are a "Trojan Horse" that has been set upon
the judiciary to wreak havoc and to emasculate the rule against hear-
say. Advocates for the exception, like the fated inhabitants of ancient
39. See Bergman, supra note 20, at 883; Lewis, supra note 20, at 126-32; Nock, supra, note
20, at 32-36; Sonenshein, supra note 20, at 901-05; Hochman, supra note 20, at 718-19; Stumpf,
supra note 20, at 94-96; Turner, supra note 20, at 1064-70.
40. Grant, supra note 20, at 93-99; Jonakait, supra note 20, at 478-81; Ross, supra note 20,
at 89-92.
41. See, e.g., Thomas Black, Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) & 804(b)(5)- The Residual
Exceptions-An Overview, 25 Hous. L. Rav. 13, 56-57 (discussing how Congressional intent
may be violated by abuse of the exceptions).
42. See generally Jo A. Harris, Catch(24): Residual Hearsay, 12 Lrro., Fall 1985, at 10.
Harris notes that "[o]ne of the problems in trying to assess the present status of the catch-alls is
that many courts are paying no more than lip service to any of the requirements. Courts are
simply not treating the residual rules as something special requiring careful analysis and articu-
lated findings." Id. at 11.
43. Washington State Judicial Council, Transcript of Meetings (1976-1978) (consideration
of the proposed Rules of Evidence).
44. Washington State Judicial Council, Transcripts 122 (Jun. 24, 1977). See also supra note
34 and accompanying text for discussion of Rule 102.
45. Washington State Judicial Council, Transcripts 5 (Sept. 11, 1976).
46. Washington State Judicial Council, supra note 44, at 122.
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Troy, erroneously believed that the exceptions could be adequately
controlled by adding strict requirements for admission.4 7 Yet time has
proven that the federal courts have not been consistent in their use of
the exceptions, and it does not seem likely that the exceptions will ever
be applied in a coherent and uniform fashion.0 A good portion of this
inconsistency must be attributed to the noncategorical nature of such
a vague provision. 49 The author thinks Washington's decision to reject
the residuals is sound.
The WJC based its rejection of the residual exceptions on four
premises:" (1) trial judges would vary greatly in their application of
"the elastic standard of equivalent trustworthiness";"t (2) lack of uni-
formity in application of the standard makes "preparation for trial
difficult"; 2 (3) appellate courts would be unable to "effectively apply
corrective measures";53 and (4) Rule 102 gives courts "room to con-
strue an existing hearsay exception broadly in the interest of ascertain-
ing truth . . . ,,14 These reasons essentially echo the concerns
originally expressed by the House Judiciary Committee in 1973 5 For
a greater appreciation of the WJC's decision, it is helpful to take a
deeper look at the requirements for admission of residual hearsay and
to examine how they have been applied in the federal courts.
IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION OF RESDuAL HEARSAY
A. Standards for Measuring Trustworthiness
Close examination of the elastic standard of "guarantees of trust-
worthiness" demonstrates that application is limited only by the imag-
47. FED. R. EvmD. 803(24). To satisfy the concerns expressed by the House, the Senate
"adopted a residual exception for Rules 803 and 804(b) of much narrower scope and applicabil-
ity than the Supreme Court version." S. REP. No. 1277, supra note 23, at 16. It was thought and
intended by the Senate "that in any case in which evidence is sought to be admitted under these
subsections, the trial judge will exercise no less care, reflection and caution than the courts did
under the common law in establishing the now-recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule." Id.
48. Federal case law has demonstrated that application of the standards for admission un-
der the residuals has been anything but uniform and predictable. See Harris, supra note 42.
49. Neither of the residuals fit within a class exception. In the traditional approach to hear-
say, the judge must make a determination of whether the particular circumstances surrounding
the assertion satisfy the elements of an exception; however, with the residuals, the judge merely
makes a determination of whether the hearsay is necessary and trustworthy. The lack of con-
straints on such an open-ended approach has produced diverse interpretations within the federal
courts. See, e.g., Jonakait, supra note 20, at 458-67.





55. H.R. RaP. No. 650, supra note 30, at 5; S. RaP. No. 1277, supra note 23, at 7065.
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ination. The other enumerated exceptions to the hearsay rule each
have specific reasons posited as providing guarantees of trustworthi-
ness. The problem, then, is how to accurately delineate such a stan-
dard in a catchall exception. At present, the general language
requirement for "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" has
inspired judicial formulation of three independent standards for meas-
uring trustworthiness: extrinsic corroboration only, both extrinsic cor-
roboration and surrounding circumstances, and surrounding
circumstances only. Applications of these standards have not yet ex-
hausted all possibilities . 6
The extrinsic corroboration standard measures trustworthiness by
analyzing factors that are outside the evidence itself. This includes the
availability at trial of the out-of-court declarant. The Fifth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Barnes7 is an example of how this stan-
dard is used. In Barnes the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to
import and possess cocaine and of possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute.58 At trial the government brought in a codefendant's prior
confession that implicated Barnes. Barnes contended that the trial
court erred by not instructing the jury to consider this confession for
impeachment purposes only. 9 The Fifth Circuit disagreed and found
the confession admissible as substantive evidence. 6° The court deter-
mined that the confession bore circumstantial guarantees of trustwor-
thiness because the declarant was available and in fact testified. 61 In
addition, the declarant's statement was corroborated by the agents
who took it and by the testimony of another coconspirator whose ac-
counts of the scheme were remarkably similar to the declarant's. 6
Such an analysis clearly ignores circumstances that surrounded the
out-of-court statement and, instead, bases admission solely on matters
that occurred at trial.
A second standard measures trustworthiness by looking at the sur-
rounding circumstances involved in the making of the out-of-court
statement as well as the extrinsic corroboration. 63 United States v. Van
56. See Sonenshein, supra note 20.
57. 586 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1978).
58. Id. at 1054.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1055.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Panzardi-Lespier, 918 F.2d 313, 316 (1st Cir. 1990); United
States v. Lang, 904 F.2d 618, 624 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 305 (1990); United States
v. Fernandez, 892 F.2d 976, 980 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed sub noma. Recarey v. United
States, 495 U.S. 944 (1990); United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944, 956-57 (7th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Chapman, 866 F.2d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989); United
RESIDUAL HEARSAY EXCEPTION
Lufkins" is representative of this standard. Van Lufkins was con-
victed of assault for kicking his victim in the head. 65 He argued that
the district court erred by admitting hearsay statements made by the
victim to his sister and an FBI agent because the statements lacked
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the decision to admit the
statements.
67
The court found the testimony to be trustworthy because the vic-
tim's statements were made shortly after the incident and it was a for-
tuitous circumstance that caused the witness to be at the same place. 68
Furthermore, the victim's statement to the FBI agent was found to be
sufficiently trustworthy because it was corroborated by other evi-
dence. 69 From this cursory statement of the case it is apparent that the
court used both extrinsic corroboration and surrounding circum-
stances to arrive at its conclusion.
A third view used in determining the standard for trustworthiness
looks to the circumstances surrounding the extrajudicial statement;
extrinsic corroboration is ignored. 70 Representative of this standard is
Karme v. Commissioner.7' In Karme the defendant claimed that the
Tax Court committed reversible error by receiving certain bank re-
cords and testimony in evidence. 72 Karme correctly claimed that the
bank records could not be brought within the "business records"
States v. Workman, 860 F.2d 140, 146 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989);
United States v. York, 852 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Roberts, 844 F.2d 537, 546
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983 (1988); United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1445-46
(8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Cree,
778 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Van Lufkins, 676 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1982) (dis-
cussed infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 1348-50 (3d Cir.
1978); United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d
285 (5th Cir. 1976); see also sources cited infra note 110.
64. 676 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1982).
65. Id. at 1191.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1192.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Wilander v. McDermott Int'l, Inc., 887 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 498
U.S. 337 (1991); United States v. Wilkus, 875 F.2d 649, 655 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 865
(1989); United States v. Marshall, 856 F.2d 896, 901-02 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Ho-
ward, 774 F.2d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 1985); Barker v. Morris, 761 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063 (1986); Karme v. Commissioner, 673 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1982)
(discussed infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text); Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286,
293-95 (7th Cir. 1979).
71. 673 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1982).
72. Id. at 1064.
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exception 73 because Special IRS Agent James Lynch, who microfilmed
the documents, was not a custodian capable of testifying that the re-
cords were kept in the course of regularly conducted business activ-
ity. 74 Nevertheless, the court admitted the records under 803(24). 71 The
court found that the bank records bore circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness because of the distant location of the bank and be-
cause there was no evidence to suggest the bank records were anything
other than what they purported to be.76 This analysis excluded the use
of extrinsic corroboration; the court relied completely on the sur-
rounding circumstances.
As these cases indicate, a court need not be consistent in its use of
such standards. The standard used can very easily be changed to meet
the necessities of current political expediency or judicial whim. We
have here a container into which anything can be poured.
The amorphous character of the trustworthiness requirement is
highlighted in the near-miss situation. A "near miss" occurs when the
out-of-court statement almost fits within an enumerated exception,
but just misses falling within the exception because it lacks some fac-
tor that defines the exception. Some courts hold that such evidence
may properly be admitted under the residuals; other courts hold the
opposite.
in United States v. Leslie77 the Fifth Circuit determined that a "near
miss" can properly be admitted under the residual exception on the
ground of "near miss" alone. The defendants in Leslie were convicted
of transporting a stolen automobile from Indiana to Alabama. 8 Dur-
ing interrogation by the FBI, the appellants made incriminating state-
ments that they later recanted. 79 The jury was instructed at trial that
73. FED. R. Evm. 803(6). A business record is admissible when it is:
kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness,
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indi-
cate lack of trustworthiness.
Id.
74. Karme, 673 F.2d at 1064.
75. Id. at 1065.
76. Id.
77. 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1976). Other cases where "near miss" hearsay has been admitted
are United States v. Fernandez, 892 F.2d 976 (11 th Cir. 1989); United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d
944 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Doe, 860 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1049 (1989); United States v. Workman, 860 F.2d 140 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Roberts,
844 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1988); Karme v. Commissioner, 673 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1982); United
States v. AT&T, 516 F. Supp. 1237 (D.D.C. 1981).
78. Leslie, 542 F.2d at 286.
79. Id. at 287.
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prior inconsistent statements were received for the sole purpose of de-
termining credibility and were not to be considered as substantive evi-
dence.8 0 Appellants contended that the limiting instruction was
insufficient, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals thought the jury
was entitled in any case to consider the statements substantively under
803(24). 81
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1), prior inconsistent state-
ments must generally be subjected to cross-examination, and in any
case must be under oath, before they can be used as substantive evi-
dence;82 however, using 803(24), the Fifth Circuit concluded that cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness were equivalent to the
somewhat inflexible requirements of 801(d)(1). 83 First, the court deter-
mined that the declarants/appellants were available for cross-exami-
nation by the party against whom the statements were made. 4 Second,
the court emphasized that the statements were made only a few hours
after the events related in them and were transcribed shortly thereaf-
ter. 5 Finally, the declarants admitted that they knowingly and volun-
tarily signed forms waiving their right to remain silent.8 6 The Fifth
Circuit concluded that the prior statements bore sufficient guarantees
of trustworthiness; therefore cross-examination was not required.
An opposite view appears in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co.87 In Zenith the defendants contended that the
"residual hearsay exceptions cannot be invoked as the basis for the
admissibility of evidence which is generically of a type covered by an-
other specific hearsay exception, but which fails to meet the precise
80. Id. at 288.
81. Id. at 289.
82. Federal Rule 801(d)(l) provides as follows:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay.-A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) Prior statement by witness.-The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) incon-
sistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty
of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent
with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one
of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; .
FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(l).




87. 505 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Other cases that have not admitted "near miss"
hearsay are In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub
nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); United States v.
Love, 592 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1979).
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requirements of that specific exception." 8 The issue confronted was
whether a business record must qualify for admission under Rule
803(6) and not under the residual exceptions. 9 The district court
agreed in principle with the defendants' position, but refused to apply
it to the evidence presented. 9°
The district court quoted the Advisory Committee's explanation
that the residual exceptions are designed to cover "new and presently
unanticipated situations" and the Senate Judiciary's comment that
''an overly broad residual hearsay exception could emasculate the
hearsay rule . . . ."91 The Advisory Committee, in this court's view,
did not intend for the residual exceptions to be used to qualify evi-
dence which is of a type covered (or not quite covered) by a .specific
exception.9 2 These exemplary cases demonstrate the wide range of in-
terpretations possible under the catchall exceptions.
B. Lack of Uniformity in Application
The second major problem with residual hearsay is its lack of any
certainty, uniformity, or predictability. This has created a great deal
of doubt about the rule against hearsay. As a result, preparation for
trial has become more difficult because attorneys can no longer be
certain whether an out-of-court declaration is inadmissible. As previ-
ously discussed, the standard of circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness is impossible to define narrowly and is limited only by the
imagination. Equally abused by the courts is the requirement that the
hearsay be more probative than any other evidence available.
The residuals allow a proponent to use hearsay only if other equally
probative evidence cannot be obtained by.reasonable efforts. 93 Hear-
say statements will thus tend to be admitted when no other evidence
can be found. However, a great number of cases involve situations
where it is difficult to determine which piece of evidence is more pro-
88. Zenith, 505 F. Supp. at 1262.
89. Id. at 1263.
90. Id. at 1263-64.
91. Id. at 1263. The Advisory Committee notes state that the residuals "do not contemplate
an unfettered exercise of judicial discretion, but they do provide for treating new and presently
unanticipated situations which demonstrate a trustworthiness within the spirit of the specifically
stated exceptions." FED. R. EviD. 803(24) advisory committee notes. The notes also state that
the Senate Judiciary Committee agreed "with those supporters of the House version who felt
that an overly broad residual hearsay exception could emasculate the hearsay rule and the recog-
nized exceptions or vitiate the rationale behind codification of the rules." Id. Senate Judiciary
Committee notes.
92. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1263 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
93. See FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
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bative. In United States v. Iaconetti94 the jury found a federal govern-
ment contract inspector guilty of soliciting and accepting a bribe. The
defendant moved for a new trial on the ground that the verdict rested
upon the rebuttal evidence of two government witnesses which should
have been excluded. 95 After analyzing the events that happened on a
critical date, the court determined that the testimony of the two rebut-
tal witnesses was the most powerful evidence on the crucial issue of
what was said in view of the outright conflict between the chief wit-
ness for the prosecution and the defendant. 96
The residuals demand that the most probative evidence be used;
thus, the most probative evidence must be more likely to logically
prove an issue than other evidence. 97 Contrary to what the residuals
demand, the court in Iaconnetti chose from several items of evidence
that were equally probative. This action renders null the requirement
that residual hearsay be more probative. In any case, everything else
being equal, hearsay should be admitted only when necessary.
Problems with the more probative requirement also appear in the
Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Toney.98 Toney, who was
convicted of bank robbery, contended that the incriminating stolen
"bait" money in his possession came from gambling with a codefen-
dant, Jimmie King. 99 To corroborate his story, Toney offered a state-
ment taken from King in which he admitted to playing dice with
Toney and claimed that both men won a substantial amount of
money.100 The government offered the hearsay testimony of two men,
David Walden and Otis Woods, in rebuttal.10' They claimed to have
seen Toney's gambling activities. 0 2 From their testimony the trier was
invited to infer that Toney had actually suffered a net loss while gam-
bling, and that King, though present in the gambling hall, did not
gamble with Toney. 03
King's statement was excluded at trial, but on appeal the Sixth Cir-
cuit approved the evidence because the statement was "more proba-
tive on the point for which it [was] offered than any other evidence"
94. 406 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1041 (1977).
95. Id. at 555.
96. Id. at 559.
97. See FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804(b)(5); see also Anderson v. Harry's Army Surplus Inc.,
324 N.W.2d 96 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
98. 599 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1979).
99. Id. at 788.
100. Id. at 789.
101. Id. at 788-89.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 789.
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that Toney could obtain.' 4 The court arguably erred in finding King's
statement to be more probative than Toney's direct testimony. Unlike
Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.,' °1 which inspired
the creation of the approach that residual exceptions were designed to
embody,' °6 King's statement was admitted on the general theory that a
jury needs access to all possible information to ascertain the truth.' °7
In Dallas County, however, hearsay evidence was admitted because no
other reliable and competent evidence was available to resolve the is-
sue in controversy.
C. Notice
Another problem with inconsistency is the requirement for notice.
Contrary to the intent of Congress, the courts have been very lenient
in their application of this requirement. A flexible notice requirement
effectively destroys pretrial predictability and serves to further weaken
the hearsay rule. The residual exceptions state that notice of intent to
admit a statement is to be given "sufficiently in advance of the trial or
hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to pre-
pare to meet it . ."108 The notice requirement, however, like the
standard for trustworthiness, is vague. Consequently, the courts have
not been consistent in its use. Some courts strictly adhere to the notice
requirement,1°9 but the majority have been quite flexible and admitted
evidence even when notice is first given after commencement of
trial."10
104. Id. at 790.
105. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
106. FED. R. Evm. 803(24) Senate Judiciary Committee notes. These notes cite Dallas
County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961) (containing standards
for admitting hearsay that does not fit within a traditional exception).
107. United States v. Toney, 599 F.2d 787, 790 (6th Cir. 1979).
108. FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
109. See Wilander v. McDermott Int'l, Inc., 887 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Wilkus, 875 F.2d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Cowley, 720 F.2d 1037, 1045 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1029 (1984); Johnson v. William C. Ellis & Sons Iron Works,
Inc., 609 F.2d 820, 823 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 358 (2d Cir.
1978); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 72 n.30 (2d Cir. 1977); see also infra notes 140-56
and accompanying text.
110. See United States v. Panzardi-Lespier, 918 F.2d 313, 317 (1st Cir. 1990); United States
v. Calkins, 906 F.2d 1240, 1245 (8th Cir. 1990); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner &
Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1553 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Chapman, 866 F.2d 1326, 1332 (1 1th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Doe, 860 F.2d 488, 492 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Bailey, 581
F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Iaconetti, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); see also infra notes 123-39 and accompanying text.
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In United States v. Frazier"' the defendant objected to the use of
803(24) on the grounds that timely notice had not been given." ' The
court disagreed and found that testimony could be admitted where a
fair opportunity to meet the statements occurred at trial and that ear-
lier notice would not have made a material difference.II3
Frazier was convicted in a jury trial of assault and other crimes aris-
ing out of an attack on a three-year-old victim." 4 Four declarations
given by the victim, Nicole, were received over Frazier's objections.
The first statement was an initial report of the incident, which was
given to Nicole's fourteen-year-old sister upon Nicole's return home
from school."' The second account was given to Nicole's mother." 6
The third was given to a naval shipyard security officer.17 The fourth
was made to a Philadelphia detective the day after the attack." 8 Al-
though the government turned over the statements about five weeks
before the trial, the government did not give written notice of its in-
tention to rely on 803(24) at that time." 9
Frazier contended that 803(24) was intended to be narrowly con-
strued and that admission of the victim's statements was error. 20 The
district judge disagreed. The court observed that the purpose of the
notice requirement was to give the defendant the opportunity to at-
tack the trustworthiness of a statement.' 2' Even though Frazier was
not given written notice of the government's intention to rely on
803(24), the court believed that Frazier had had a fair opportunity to
attack the trustworthiness of the statements.'22 Though the evidence
might have been used as prior inconsistent statements to impeach, the
government instead employed Rule 803(24) as a device to make the
statements substantive evidence.
Unlike United States v. Frazier, where the defendant received state-
ments five weeks before trial, other courts have admitted statements
where there was no such forewarning.' 3 In United States v. Carl-
111. 678 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 806 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1986).
112. Id. at 502-03.
113. Id. at 503.
114. Id. at 501.




119. Id. at 503.
120. Id. at 503-04.
121. Id. at 503 (citing Piva v. Xerox Corp., 654 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1981)).
122. Id.
123. See Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 93 (1st Cir. 1979). cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035
(1980); United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Carlson, 547
F.2d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); United States v. Leslie, 542
F.2d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 1976).
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son,124 for example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it
was proper to receive evidence under the residuals despite the lack of
any formal pretrial notice at all. 125 The defendants were convicted of
cocaine offenses. Notice was excused at trial when (1) the government
learned that its witness would disobey a court order and refuse to tes-
tify on the eve of trial, (2) the defendant was acutely aware of the
substance of the proffered evidence, and (3) the transcript of the
grand jury testimony was given to the defendant two days before
trial. 26
United States v. Leslie 27 involved an equally liberal application of
the notice requirement. In this case the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that some latitude in the notice requirement must be permitted
when the need for particular evidence first becomes apparent after the
trial begins.'2 Even if counsel did not give notice, the Leslie court
held that because defense counsel undoubtedly expected the prosecu-
tion to call one or more of the alleged accomplices, and because de-
fense counsel was able to thoroughly examine them as to their mental
condition and motivation, fair opportunity had been provided to meet
the statements, even if no notice had been given. 12 9
In United States v. Bailey the court focused on fairness. 30 The
court determined that the notice requirement is satisfied when the pro-
ponent of the evidence is without fault in failing to give notice prior to
trial and the trial judge offers sufficient time, by means of a continu-
ance, for the adverse party to prepare to contest the evidence and/or
its admission. 3'
Perhaps the most liberal application of the notice requirement is
found in Furtado v. Bishop,'32 where state prisoners sued prison offi-
cials to recover for alleged beatings, unjustified segregated confine-
ments, and deprivation of their right to communicate with courts."'
At trial the plaintiffs argued that the defendants were not prejudiced
by a failure to give notice of intent to offer a particular affidavit be-
cause defendants were not, as claimed, surprised by the document. 34
Defense counsel's comments indicated that he had anticipated that the
124. 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976).
125. Id. at 1355.
126. Id.
127. 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1976).
128. Id. at 291.
129. Id.
130. 581 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1978).
131. Id.
132. 604 F.2d 80 (lst Cir. 1979).
133. Id. at 85.
134. Id. at 92.
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evidence would be offered.' 3 Though the trial court's offer of a con-
tinuance was abrupt, defense counsel showed little interest in such an
option. 136 Upholding admission of the affidavit, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that defense counsel's waiver of contin-
uance, along with his expectation that the disputed evidence would be
offered, were sufficient to obviate the notice requirement. 137 The court
found some justification for this liberal interpretation in the fact that,
unlike the majority of other cases, the instant case was civil. 38 When
there is no constitutional right of confrontation, the court thought
that freer play should be given to the discretion of the trial judge in
admitting evidence. '39
A minority of courts has adopted a strict approach to the notice
requirement. ,40 In these cases use of residual hearsay is prohibited un-
less advance notice is given. A good example is the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision in United States v. Cowley. 4 In this case
the defendants appealed their conviction of willfully and knowingly
making material false declarations before a grand jury. 42 The pivotal
factual dispute centered on a bank executive's role in a banking trans-
action. 43 At trial the judge allowed the managing director of Interna-
tional Investment Bank to testify, over objection, that he received two
letters purporting to be from the executive.44 These letters failed to
meet the requirements of any enumerated exception. 14 The defendants
argued that because the government did not give advance notice of its
intention to offer the banker's testimony about the letters, the testi-
mony did not fall within Rule 803(24).'"
The court agreed and found that the lack of notice made the testi-
mony inadmissible hearsay under Rule 803(24). 47 Admission of this
testimony as foundation for the letters was error-but harmless er-
ror. 4 Because there was abundant evidence to support the jury's con-
135. Id.




140. See United States v. Cowley, 720 F.2d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1029 (1984); United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 358 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Oates,
560 F.2d 45, 72-73 n.30 (2d Cir. 1977); see also supra note 109.
141. 720 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1029 (1984).
142. Id. at 1039.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1044.
145. Id.
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clusion, the court determined that the trial judge's admission of the
testimony did not merit reversal.149 Thus, in spite of the inadmissibil-
ity of the statement under the enumerated exceptions, the government
was still able to make use of the incriminating declarations.
Another example of the strict approach comes from United States
v. Ruffin, 150 where the court held that Rule 803(24) could be utilized
only if notice of an intention to rely upon it were given in advance of
trial. '5 The defendant was convicted of income tax evasion for filing
false and fraudulent personal and corporate income tax returns. 5 2 At
trial, the court admitted testimony from a clerk about what various
land record documents in the county clerk's office indicated.'53 On ap-
peal, the court held that the decision to allow the clerk's testimony
about the content of the documents was error because it frustrated the
legislative intent underlying the enactment of the residuals. 5 4 The
court found that "[t]here is absolutely no doubt that Congress in-
tended that the requirement of advance notice be rigidly enforced."'35
Dispensing with pretrial notice "would ... countenance outright cir-
cumvention of the carefully considered and drafted requirements of
Fed. R. Evid. 803(24)."156
D. The Confrontation Clause Dilemma
Predictability has also been eroded by use of the residual exceptions
and the conflicts that are encountered with the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause. The Sixth Amendment states simply: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him . . . ." "' This tends to enhance
the reliability and trustworthiness of the evidence. An early effort to
articulate the meaning of the Confrontation Clause came in Mattox v.
United States.5 " The Supreme Court identified the primary purpose of
confrontation as the prevention of trial by ex parte affidavits and the
provision of opportunity for cross-examination before the jury, except
149. Id.
150. 575 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1978).
151. Id. at 358.
152. Id. at 349.
153. Id. at 357.
154. Id. at 358.
155. Id. (quoting United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 72 n.30 (2d Cir. 1977)).
156. Id.
157. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
158. 156 U.S. 237 (1895). The court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused's
right to compel the witness "to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at
him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief." Id. at 242-43.
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in certain cases of necessity." 9 The problem with the residual excep-
tions is that they permit the use of the type of hearsay which has not
been received since the Seventeenth Century. The resulting confusion
has created two separate approaches.
1. The Liberal Approach
In the most liberal approach, grand jury testimony may be admitted
without violating the hearsay rule or the Confrontation Clause when
the prerequisite of trustworthiness is met.'10 This approach has been
adopted in several circuits, of which the Fourth Circuit has been the
most consistent.
In United States v. West' 6' a tape-recorded transcript of grand jury
testimony made by Victor Brown, who was slain before trial, was re-
ceived in evidence. The transcript was used to convict the defendant
of distributing heroin. 62 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that such testimony was permissible under Rule 804(b)(5) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment.'63 In their argument, the defendants focused on the re-
quirement for "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness." 64 To show that Brown's testimony was untrustworthy, the
defendants pointed out Brown's prior criminal record and emphasized
their lack of any opportunity to cross-examine him. 165
The Fourth Circuit described Brown's testimony as proceeding
from "very exceptional circumstances providing substantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness."'' 66 Before Brown made contact with the de-
fendants, agents took elaborate steps to assure that Brown had no
drugs or money other than what was supplied by the agents. In addi-
tion, Brown was under constant surveillance, photographs were taken
of the drug transactions, and Brown's transmitter was broadcasting
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., United States v. Panzardi-Lespier, 918 F.2d 313, 316, 317 (lst Cir. 1990);
United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944, 958 (7th Cir. 1989); Barker v. Morris, 761 F.2d 1396 (9th
Cir. 1985); United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 964 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945
(1983); United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 588-89 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016
(1982); United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141, 1144 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936
(1978); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1135 (4th Cir. 1978); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56 (1980) (preliminary hearing testimony).
161. 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978).
162. Id. at 1133.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1134.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1135.
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his conversations with the defendants. 6 7 Because agents had so thor-
oughly documented the transactions, deception by Brown was virtu-
ally impossible.'6
The hearsay testimony of Brown satisfied the requirements of Dut-
ton v. Evans, 69 in that it bore sufficient "indicia of reliability" and
provided the jury with a firm basis for judging the truthfulness of
Brown's statements. 70 The Dutton court looked to the "indicia of re-
liability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a
statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confronta-
tion of the declarant. ' ' 17' The effect was that the court merged the
hearsay inquiry concerning trustworthiness with the constitutional in-
quiry. As stated in West, "It should not be surprising that the same
circumstances suffice to meet the requirements of Rule 804(b)(5) and
of the Confrontation Clause.' 7 v2
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals again addressed the issue of
when to admit grand jury testimony in United States v. Garner.'73 In
Garner the trial court admitted the sworn grand jury testimony of
Warren Robinson, a witness who refused to testify at trial. As in
West, the Fourth Circuit ruled that such testimony did not violate the
Confrontation Clause if it bore sufficient guarantees of reliability and
the circumstances contained a sufficient basis for a jury to assess its
trustworthiness. 174
Like West, Garner involved a drug trafficking charge; however, the
guarantees of trustworthiness in Garner were not as strong as in West.
To corroborate Robinson's grand jury testimony, the prosecution pro-
duced a witness who confirmed Robinson's statements. 75 Moreover,
the prosecution introduced records of airline tickets, customs declara-
tions, passport endorsements, and European hotel registrations, which
showed irrefutable evidence of the defendants' travels to the sites of
the drug transactions. 76 Though weaker than in West, the court deter-
mined that the evidence was still sufficient to meet the requirements of
the Confrontation Clause.' 7
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 400U.S. 74 (1970).
170. United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1137-38 (4th Cir. 1978).
171. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89.
172. West, 574 F.2d at 1138.
173. 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1978).
174. Id. at 1144.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1145.
177. Id. at 1146.
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This approach was adopted by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
in United States v. Barlow. 178 Barlow claimed that his right to con-
frontation was violated and that under Rule 804(b)(5), the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting the grand jury testimony of his wife,
who refused to testify against the defendant at trial.7 9 The court of
appeals did not agree; the three judges thought the statements made
by the declarant, lantha Humphries, carried substantial guarantees of
trustworthiness. 180 Humphries' testimony, which conflicted with Bar-
low's alibi, conveyed personal, inside information. Though Hum-
phries' testimony did not have the strong corroboration that was
found in West, the court drew the distinction between testimony used
as direct evidence in proving guilt and testimony used to prove a "col-
lateral" matter.' 8' By itself, Humphries' testimony did not relate evi-
dence of criminal activity; therefore, the court reasoned,
corroboration need not be as strong.' In drawing such a distinction,
the Sixth Circuit created yet another twist to the elastic standard of
trustworthiness: The courts may develop an ambiguous, sliding scale
of corroborative evidence and gauge admissibility according to the
purpose for which the evidence is offered.
For its Sixth Amendment analysis, the Barlow court resorted to the
two-step test announced by the Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts.183
This test requires (1) that the declarant be unavailable and (2) that the
declarations possess "adequate indicia of reliability."1 4 The Supreme
Court added that "[rieliability can be inferred without more in a case
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In
other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing
of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."' 8s Under this two-
step analysis, unavailability of the witness was not an issue in Barlow;
however, the court addressed the question of reliability.'8 The Barlow
court also refused to distinguish between the trustworthiness require-
ments of Rule 804(b)(5) and the Sixth Amendment, though it assumed
that a distinction existed.187
178. 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982).
179. Id. at 960.
180. Id. at 962.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 962-63.
183. Id. at 963 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).
184. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
185. Id.
186. United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 964 (6th Cir. 1982).
187. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals followed a similar approach
in United States v. Boulahanis,'88 in which the defendant appealed his
conviction for violation of the Hobbs Act and other offenses.' 8 9 At
trial, a key witness, James Chiampas, refused to testify because he
feared for his life; nevertheless, the court permitted publication of
Chiampas's grand jury testimony.' 90 Boulahanis contended that ad-
mission of the grand jury transcript violated both the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Sixth Amendment. The court found, however, that
the testimony had sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to meet the
requirements of 804(b)(5) and the Confrontation Clause. A tape had
been made of extortionate conversations between the declarant and
the defendant.' 9' Though Chiampas was not cross-examined, his state-
ment was made voluntarily. 92 In addition, other eyewitness testimony
corroborated Chiampas' grand jury testimony. 93 The court found the
evidence highly trustworthy, so admission did not violate the Sixth
Amendment or Rule 804(b)(5).194
2. The Waiver Theory
The second major approach to admissibility of grand jury testi-
mony is the waiver theory. A valid waiver occurs when there has been
an intentional abandonment of a known right or privilege. With
waiver theory, a party, through his conduct, is presumed to have re-
linquished his constitutional right to confrontation. 95 At least four
circuits have used this approach.1 96 The leading case is the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision in United States v. Carlson.19" Here, the main issue in-
volved admissibility of the grand jury testimony of James Tindall,
who refused to testify on the eve of trial for fear of reprisals. 98 The
court determined that the testimony was admissible under Rule
804(b)(5) because it was, as circumstances suggested, trustworthy.' 99
188. 677 F.2d 586 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982).
189. Id. at 587.
190. Id. at 588-89.
191. Id. at 587.
192. Id. at 589.
193. Id. at 588.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938).
196. See United States v. Cree, 778 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Mastrangelo,
693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 825 (1982); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
840 (1980).
197. 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976).
198. Id. at 1352.
199. Id.
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Tindall's testimony related facts that surrounded a cocaine transaction
in which he participated and of which he had firsthand knowledge. 2°°
In addition, Tindall's statements were made under oath and he never
recanted his grand jury testimony or expressed reservations about its
accuracy.201 The court concluded that Tindall's testimony was suffi-
ciently trustworthy to be admitted under Rule 804(b)(5).
In analyzing the Confrontation Clause issue, the Carlson court
chose to assume that Carlson's right of confrontation might be af-
fronted upon admission of Tindall's grand jury testimony. 20 2 The
question, then, was whether Carlson had somehow waived his rights.
Waiver can take various forms. An accused may forego his right by
neglecting to cross-examine witnesses, by stipulating to the admission
of evidence, or by entering a guilty plea. In Carlson, however, the
court held that an accused may waive his right of confrontation by
pursuing a course of conduct inimical to the administration of jus-
tice. 20 3 The court found that Carlson intimidated Tindall into not testi-
fying, and determined that such conduct effects a waiver of the right
of confrontation, stating that "the Sixth Amendment does not stand
as a shield to protect the accused from his own misconduct or chican-
ery.' '0 Therefore admittance of Tindall's grand jury testimony
caused no constitutional error.205
The previous discussion is intended to demonstrate how the residu-
als can effectively emasculate the rule against hearsay. As with the
other requirements for admitting hearsay, the courts have also been
inconsistent in applying the Confrontation Clause. Statements that
were once inadmissible under the specific exceptions can now be
brought in through the "back door" under the catchall exceptions.
Hence, sometimes those accused of committing a crime must now de-
fend themselves against hearsay statements without an opportunity to
confront their accusers. Moreover, broad application of the residuals
has reduced pretrial predictability. No longer can one accurately as-
certain whether a statement is inadmissible hearsay. This is not merely
an argument of law over justice. The rule against hearsay was created,
among other things, to promote justice by ensuring the exclusion of
unreliable evidence. Application of the residual exceptions in the fed-
eral courts helps demonstrate that truth and justice may better be
served in those states that have excluded the catchall exceptions.
200. Id. at 1354.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1355.
203. Id. at 1358.
204. Id. at 1359.
205. Id.
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V. RULE 102 IS SUFFICIENT FOR OUR CURRENT NEEDS
Evidence Rule 102 gives the trial judge authority to interpret the
rules in such fashion as to avoid unjust results.ee To reach a just re-
sult, judges are granted broad discretion in circumstances that are not
explicitly covered by the rules. When applying the rules, judges may
reasonably be asked to outline the salient policies, factors, and goals
so the bar may adjust accordingly. This promotes an appropriate bal-
ance between the need to accommodate change and the need to pre-
serve rudimentary principles of evidence. When compared with the
uncertainty produced by the residual exceptions, the flexibility pro-
vided by Rule 102 presents a preferable means to preserve the rule
against hearsay and yet not unduly restrict the production of data
conducive to the discovery of truth. Notwithstanding this sound rea-
soning, the WJC's stance against adopting 803(24) and 804(b)(5) has
not come without criticism.o'
It has been argued that lack of a separate residual exception will
cause existing exceptions to be twisted beyond their appropriate
scope. 208 In Washington State, two supreme court decisions have been
taken to justify this concern.201 Some may argue that such "funda-
mentally unsound" decisions mandate the need for a safety-valve ex-
ception to the hearsay rule; however, such arguments are based on the
premise that the general exception can be controlled by stricter re-
quirements and that the evidence, though hearsay, sufficiently sup-
ports the policy of ensuring a fair trial.2t 0
206. The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 102 states that "[flollowing the rules is not an
end in itself. Rather the rules are carefully designed to enable judges, lawyers, litigants, and
juries to achieve sound results .... Rule 102 recognizes the responsibility judges bear by enu-
merating goals which cannot be achieved mechanically, and which will compete with another at
times." (quoting 10 MooRE's FEDERALs PRACTICE, 102.02 (1976)). The comments further note
that "[tlhis approach implies a considerable grant of discretion to the trial judge in situations
not explicitly covered by the rules which may require differentiated treatment in the light of
special factors." (citing I J. WEINsTEIN, EVIDENCE 102101] (1975)). WASH. R. EvID. 102 cmts.
207. See Nock, supra note 20.
208. The Senate Judiciary Committee expressed concern that "without a separate residual
provision, the specifically enumerated exceptions could become tortured beyond any reasonable
circumstances which they were intended to include (even if broadly construed)." FED. R. Evw.
803(24) Senate Judiciary Committee note; see also Nock, supra note 20.
209. See State v. Parris, 654 P.2d 77 (Wash. 1982); State v. Smith, 651 P.2d 207 (Wash.
1982).
210. See Nock, supra note 20, at 8-32. Nock points out that Parris and Smith have expanded
the scope of the residual hearsay exceptions, opening the door to a great deal of falsehood. Id.
Instead of arguing for the exclusion of the statements, Nock argues for the adoption of a
"safety-valve" exception even though the court failed to adequately address the requirements of
the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 30-32.
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A. State v. Parris21'
John Parris was charged as an accomplice in the unlawful delivery
of heroin.2"2 On the night of the incident, an informant, Milliron, con-
tacted the police and advised them that he had arranged a "buy" of
heroin. Milliron, along with Officer Hurley, drove to the address
where the transaction was to occur. Upon arrival, the two were met by
William DeHart, who told Milliron and Hurley that someone was get-
ting the drugs. Milliron asked, "Do you mean John's going to get
them?"; 213 but, at trial, he could not recall DeHart's response to the
question. Milliron also asked from whom [John] was going to get the
drugs, and DeHart responded "that he did not know. ' ' 21 4 DeHart,
Milliron, and Hurley arranged to meet one-half hour later.215
At trial Parris objected to the testimony by Hurley and Milliron
about their earlier conversation. 2 6 The objection was based on the
grounds that the testimony made DeHart a witness against Parris.
This was significant because DeHart had asserted his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination and therefore Parris could
not cross-examine DeHart. 11 The trial court found the testimony ad-
missible on the ground that it qualified as an exception to the hearsay
rule under Evidence Rule 804(b)(3), as a statement against penal inter-
est." The court of appeals219 and the Supreme Court of Washington
affirmed the ruling. 220
Washington Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) provides as follows:
(b) The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
. . . (3) Statement Against Interest. A statement which was at the
time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or
proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil
or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant
against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position
would not have made the statement unless the person believed it to
be true. In a criminal case, a statement tending to expose the
211. 654 P.2d 77 (Wash. 1982). See also State v. Rice, 844 P.2d 416 (1993) (The Washington
Supreme Court perceives the difficulty, but has not yet enunciated a sound doctrine.).




216. Id. at 79.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 80.
219. State v. Parris, 633 P.2d 914, 921 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
220. State v. Parris, 654 P.2d 77, 84 (Wash. 1982).
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declarant to criminal liability is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.22 '
Traditionally, the common law limited this exception to statements
against pecuniary or proprietary interests.2 22 The rationale for this lim-
itation was expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Cham-
bers v. Mississippi:2 3
Exclusion, where the limitation prevails, is usually premised on the
view that admission would lead to the frequent presentation of
perjured testimony to the jury. It is believed that confessions of
criminal activity are often motivated by extraneous considerations
and, therefore, are not as inherently reliable as statements against
pecuniary or proprietary interest. 2 4
At present, Rule 804(b)(3) includes an exception for statements
against penal interest.2 2 5 To pass muster, statements against penal in-
terest must meet requirements of the Confrontation Clause and ought
to conform to sound hearsay doctrine.2 26
The issue in Parris was whether an out-of-court statement made by
one offender is admissible against another offender as a statement
against penal interest when the statement inculpates both actors.2 27
Much of the reasoning in Parris came from the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion in United States v. Alvarez.228 In Alvarez the court held that in-
culpatory statements were admissible when corroborating
circumstances "clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the state-
ment." 2 9 The Alvarez decision was partially based on the court's fail-
ure to take a thorough look at the legislative history behind federal
Rule 804(b)(3).2 30 A more careful examination, however, shows that
the House Judiciary Committee clearly intended to omit inculpatory
statements from the exception.2 3
221. WASH. R. EviD. 804(b)(3).
222. See Bernard S. Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay
Rule, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29-52 (944).
223. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
224. Id. at 299-300.
225. FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(3).
226. 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 804-130 (1992);
James E. Beaver & Cheryl McCleary, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest: State v.
Parris Goes Too Far, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 25 (1984).
227. State v. Parris, 654 P.2d 77, 78 (Wash. 1982).
228. 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978), cited in Parris, 654 P.2d at 80.
229. Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 701.
230. Id. at 700.
231. See Nock, supra note 20, at 8-32. See generally United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123,
129-34 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981); United States v.
Goodlow, 500 F.2d 954, 957 n.2 (8th Cir. 1974) (construing the proposed rule).
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The first published drafts of 804(b)(3) stated, in part, that "[tihis
exception does not include a statement or confession offered against
the accused in a criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person
implicating both himself and the accused. ' 2 32 Although this last sen-
tence was dropped from the final draft, the Advisory Committee's
notes to this exception caution against allowing inculpatory statements
into evidence. 233 In support of this position, the notes cite Douglas v.
Alabama234 and Bruton v. United States.11 Both cases involved con-
fessions by codefendants that implicated the accused, and both courts
held such statements inadmissible. 2 6 As a cautionary note, the Advi-
sory Committee note to Rule 804(b)(3) said that "a statement admit-
ting guilt and implicating another person, made while in custody, may
well be motivated by a desire to curry favor with the authorities and
hence fail to qualify as against interest. ' 237 Aside from the concerns
expressed by the Advisory Committee, the opinion in Parris demon-
strates that the court did not follow the requirements of the rule. 28
The plain language of Rule 804(b)(3) states that the declaration
must be one which "tended to subject the declarant to civil or crimi-
nal liability, or . . .that a reasonable person in the declarant's posi-
tion would not have made the statement unless believing it to be
true. 239 This expressly requires that the declarant must be aware that
the statement was against the declarant's interest.2 4 Probative value
of the statement is guaranteed only to the extent that the declarant
knows it is against his interest. 24' Despite this requirement, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court in Parris admitted DeHart's statements even
though DeHart had no reason to believe that he was conversing with
police informants. 242 Without such knowledge, DeHart could not pos-
232. Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, 55 F.R.D. 315, 438-39 (Committee on
Practice and Procedure 1971).
233. FED. R. Evin. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's notes.
234. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
235. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
236. Id.; Douglas, 380 U.S. 415.
237. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's notes.
238. State v. Parris, 654 P.2d 77, 83 (Wash. 1982). See Beaver & McCleary, supra note 226,
for a more thorough criticism of Parris.
239. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3).
240. Id. The Parris court recognized that "it is not the fact that the declaration is against
interest but the declarant's awareness of the fact which gives the statement significance ... 
State v. Parris, 654 P.2d 77, 82 (Wash. 1982).
241. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 226, at 804-133 to 135.
242. Parris, 654 P.2d at 83. Parris believed that he was dealing with bona fide purchasers,
rather than narcotics agents and, therefore, did not expect that his statements would lead to his
arrest. The court, however, found there was no motive for him to lie. Id.
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sibly have appreciated the risk he incurred while conversing with the
informants.
As for the right of confrontation, Parris held that a statement
would satisfy the Confrontation Clause if it is within a firmly rooted
exception or if it has particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.243
The right of confrontation allows the trier of fact to check the de-
meanor of the witness.2" Furthermore, the United States Supreme
Court has held that a deprivation of the right to cross-examination
denies the accused his Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due proc-
ess of law.25
Confrontation means cross-examination.2 The only significant ex-
ception occurs when the statement is not crucial to the outcome of the
cause.2 7 In Washington, the state constitution gives the accused the
right "to meet the witnesses against him face to face. ' ' 241 This implies
that actual physical confrontation is required. In State v. Valladares49
the court pointed out that the Washington Constitution provides
greater protection than the hearsay rule and the Sixth Amendment.5 0
Given the overwhelming mandate for confrontation, the Parris deci-
sion was clearly in error.
In the search for truth, the Parris court compromised requirements
of confrontation and hearsay doctrine. The legislative history of
243. Id. at 79-81.
244. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
245. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965) ("[T]o deprive an accused of the right to
cross-examine the witnesses against him is a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
due process of law.").
246. Some form of cross-examination has always been required to satisfy the Sixth Amend-
ment. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 68-70 (1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970),
157-58; Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,
418-20 (1965).
247. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970) (no denial of the right to confrontation
because "the statement contained no express assertion about past fact, and consequently it car-
ried on its face a warning to the jury against giving the statement undue weight.").
248. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22. The Washington Constitution provides in part:
RIGHTS OF THE AcCUSED.
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person, or by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to meet the witnesses against him
face to face, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which
the offense is charged to have been committed and the right to appeal in all
cases ....
249. 664 P.2d 508 (Wash. 1983).
250. Id. at 514 (Williams, C.J., concurring specially) (The court "may interpret the Wash-
ington Constitution as more protective of individual rights than parallel provisions of the United
States Constitution .... [T]he 'face-to-face' language of Const. art. I, § 22 seems to require
actual physical confrontation between the accused and any adverse witnesses.").
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804(b)(3) shows that inculpatory third-person penal interest statements
were meant to be excluded. 25' Moreover, Washington's constitution
requires face-to-face confrontation.25 2 Abrogation of these two re-
quirements deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial. The ad-
dition of a residual exception would only compound this difficulty. If
Washington wants to preserve the rule against hearsay and promote
justice within the truth-seeking process, the creation of a residual ex-
ception will not further those goals.
B. State v. Smith 253
Richard Smith was charged with a vicious assault. 2 4 The victim,
Rachael Conlin, was severely assaulted in her motel room, which she
kept for "work-related" activities. 2"1 A police officer was called to her
hospital room; there she divulged that Smith had assaulted her, and
she did not know what to do.256 Conlin later went to the police station
where she voluntarily gave a sworn statement, which described the de-
tails of the assault and identified Smith as her assailant. 257 The affida-
vit was signed and sworn before a notary. 258
At trial Conlin reiterated the facts of her statement with the unex-
pected exception that her assailant had now become someone named
Gomez rather than the defendant Smith. 39 Conlin admitted giving the
prior statement to the police, but added that she did so because she
was angry at Smith for forcing her to stay overnight in the motel
room with Gomez. 260 When Conlin recanted her original, sworn story,
the prosecutor offered the sworn statement; it was the only evidence
identifying Smith as the assailant. The trial judge ruled the statement
to be admissible under Washington Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(i), but
later retracted his position and granted a new trial.26 The Supreme
Court of Washington reinstated the jury verdict, pronouncing the
statement admissible. 262
The relevant hearsay exception to Rule 801(d)(1)(i) provides:
251. See supra notes 221-41 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
253. 651 P.2d 207 (Wash. 1982).






260. Id. at 209.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 211.
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(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay
if-
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross examination concerning the statement,
and the statement is (i) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony,
and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition...211
The issue in Smith was whether this provision permitted "the admis-
sion of a trial witness's prior inconsistent statement, as substantive
evidence, when that statement was made as a written complaint (under
oath subject to penalty of perjury) to investigating police officers." 26"
To answer this question, the court focused on the meaning of the term
"other proceeding" found in the rule.
Though a considerable investigation was conducted, the court fo-
cused its analysis upon the reliability of the statement.161 It was felt
that guarantees of trustworthiness were met because "the statement
was attested to before a notary, under oath and subject to penalty for
perjury. ' ' 26 The statement was also written in Conlin's own words,
and the jury, seeing Conlin testify on the stand, "was in a position to
determine which statement was true." 67 Another consideration was
that the statement was the product of a police investigation that was
conducted to assist the prosecutor in determining whether to file an
information. 26 The filing of an information, a grand jury indictment,
an inquest proceeding, and the filing of a criminal complaint before a
magistrate were all identified as acceptable methods for making a de-
termination of probable cause. 269 Because the term "other proceed-
ings" was deemed to encompass the latter three methods, the, court
held that the term also included police investigations.2 70
Though one can suspect that allowing the statement into evidence in
Smith was just, the analysis used to arrive at the result is certainly
subject to attack. Under the language of Rule 801(d)(1)(i), prior in-
consistent statements are admissible as substantive evidence only if
they are "given under oath subject to penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding." 27' Formalized proceedings are con-
263. WASH. R. Evw. 801(d)(l)(i) (emphasis added).
264. State v. Smith, 651 P.2d 207, 208 (Wash. 1982).
265. Id. at 209-10.
266. Id. at 210.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 210-11.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. WASH. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(i).
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ducted in a manner designed to ensure the reliability and trustworthi-
ness of a given statement.27 2 Unlike a trial or deposition, a police
investigation cannot possibly provide the same types of guarantees
that add credibility to the witness's prior statement. Quite often, a
police investigation is conducted before the witness has had time to
calm down from what is usually a traumatizing event. At those mo-
ments, the perception and memory of the witness may be clouded. In
addition, the witness is not subject to cross-examination; thus, the op-
posing party does not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor
of the witness and check the veracity of the statement. Though there
are several indicia of reliability surrounding the making of Conlin's
statement, a station-house investigation is not the equivalent of a
"proceeding," as required by 801(d)(1)(i).
Much of the court's reasoning rests upon the questionable decision
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Castro-
Ayon. 273 While it is well-accepted that "other proceeding" includes a
grand jury proceeding,2 74 the Ninth Circuit expanded the interpreta-
tion to include a tape-recorded statement given under oath in an im-
migration investigation.2 75 In Castro-Ayon the court determined that
enough similarities existed between grand jury proceedings and immi-
gration proceedings to admit the statement .176 Unlike Castro-Ayon,
the court in Smith sidestepped the issue of whether a station-house
investigation is a "proceeding" and, instead, focused on the reliability
of the surrounding circumstances. 277
There is substantial authority that no variation of police investiga-
tive activity constitutes a proceeding. 2 8 In Florida, for example, the
272. United States v. Day, 789 F.2d 1217, 1222 n.2 (6th Cir. 1986). The court also noted that
"[i]n seeking to limit the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements for substantive purposes,
Congress determined that statements given under oath at a 'formal proceeding' were inherently
more reliable than statements given in absence of such formalities." Id. at 1222.
273. State v. Smith, 651 P.2d 207, 209 (Wash. 1982) (citing United States v. Castro-Ayon,
537 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 983 (1976)).
274. See John F. Gillespie, What Is "Other Proceeding" Under Rule 801(d)()(A) of Federal
Rules of Evidence, Excepting from Hearsay Rule Prior Inconsistent Statement Given "At a
Trial, Hearing, or Other Proceeding," 37 A.L.R. FED. 855, 857 (1978).
275. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d at 1057.
276. Id. at 1058 (immigration proceedings and grand jury proceedings are both "investiga-
tory, ex parte, inquisitive, sworn, basically prosecutorial, held before an officer other than the
arresting officer, recorded, and held in circumstances of some legal formality").
277. Smith, 651 P.2d at 211 (The court stated that "each case depends on its facts with
reliability the key.").
278. See, e.g., United States v. Livingston, 661 F.2d 239, 242-43 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Prior
inconsistent statement to postal inspector not made in "proceeding," distinguishing Castro-
Ayon on the ground that "the circumstances fall far short of those in a grand jury proceeding,
the paradigmatic 'other proceeding' under the rule." Id. at 243.); United States v. Ragghianti,
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courts have declined to follow Smith, stating, "[ilnvestigative interro-
gation is neither regulated nor regularized; it contains none of the
safeguards involved in an appearance before a grand jury . . . and it
has no quality of formality and convention which could arguably raise
the interrogation to a dignity akin to that of a hearing or trial. ' 279 The
court in Smith likened an investigation to other proceedings that are
designed to make a determination of probable cause.280 The Smith
court felt that this proved that an investigation was a proceeding. A
major error in this analysis lies in the fact that standards for proceed-
ings used to determine probable cause are lower than those required
for admitting prior inconsistent statements. 21'
Again, like the decision in Parris, the court in Smith compromised
rudimentary evidentiary principles. Evidence Rule 102 would not pro-
duce such anomalies. The victim did not give her statement in a pro-
ceeding designed to ensure its reliability. Given Washington's
requirement of "face-to-face confrontation, ' 2 2 the witness's prior
statement should have been subjected to cross-examination. Denial of
the right to confrontation deprived the defendant of a fair trial. En-
actment of the residual exception would only make unsound decisions
such as we observe in Parris and Smith easier.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because the standards for admissibility are vague, federal courts
have been inconsistent in their application of the residuals. The result-
ing open-ended use has allowed trial judges to expand upon tradi-
tional hearsay exceptions unduly. What was once inadmissible can
now be admitted against a criminal defendant as substantive evidence,
without allowing confrontation of the accuser. Furthermore, trial law-
yers can no longer effectively ascertain whether an out-of-court decla-
ration is admissible or not. For those jurisdictions that have adopted
803(24) and 804(b)(5) or their equivalent, the rule against hearsay has
560 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1977) (Inconsistent statement to investigating FBI agent inadmissi-
ble; "There is, after all, a difference between a prior statement obtained from a witness by the
police in the course of a criminal investigation, and testimony given under oath in a formal
proceeding."); Martin v. United States, 528 F.2d 1157, 1161 (4th Cir. 1975) (substantive admis-
sibility of sworn inconsistent statement to federal agents by witness is error since interrogation
was not "proceeding"); see also Delgado-Santos v. State, 471 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
279. Delgado-Santos, 471 So. 2d at 78.
280. State v. Smith, 651 P.2d 207, 210-11 (Wash. 1982).
281. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235-39 (1983) (in a proceeding for probable
cause, the identity of any witnesses and informants is often unknown and they are often unavail-
able for questioning; as a result, the statements obtained to determine probable cause are highly
suspect).
282. WASH. CoNrsT. art. I, § 22.
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potentially been vitiated. Truth and justice are best supported by
keeping catchall exceptions out of evidence rules. Hearsay evidence is
inherently unreliable, and its use can deny fair trials and allow trage-
dies such as Sir Walter Raleigh's case. If the hearsay rule is to be abol-
ished, then let us do it forthrightly and not in stages.

